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Zoology into Legend
Plato’s ‘Ornitheology’ and ‘Entomythology’1
Abstract
The myth of the cicadas (Phaedrus, 259b5ff.) and that of the dying swans (Phaedo, 
84e3ff.) occupy a special position among Plato’s myths, in that they are entirely 
the author’s invention, as scholars have often argued. However, both myths clearly 
draw on a rich poetic tradition that is already well-established in archaic epic. 
At the same time, both myths incorporate zoological details into their fabric. By 
comparing Plato’s myths both with their poetic models and with Aristotle’s zoology, I 
show how Plato’s cicadas and swans reveal a careful blend of tradition and ‘science’. 
Plato created a new hybrid, which can be jokingly christened ‘ornitheology’ and 
‘entomythology’.
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Resumo
O mito das cigarras (Fedro, 259b5sqs) e o dos cisnes morrendo (Fédon, 84e3sqs) 
ocupam uma posição especial entre os mitos de Platão, no sentido de que são 
inteiramente inventados pelo autor, como os comentadores têm frequentemente 
argumentado. Entretanto, ambos os mitos apóiam-se claramente em uma rica 
tradição poética que já está bem estabelecida na épica arcaica. Ao mesmo tempo, 
ambos os mitos incorporam detalhes zoológicos em sua composição. Comparando 
os mitos de Platão tanto com os seus modelos poéticos quanto com a zoologia de 
Aristóteles, eu mostro como as cigarras e os cisnes de Platão revelam uma cuidadosa 
mistura de tradição e ‘ciência’. Platão criou um novo híbrido, que pode ser bem-
humoradamente batizado de ‘orniteologia’ e ‘entomitologia’. 
Palavras-chave: Platão, cigarras, cisnes, zoologia, mito.
1  I presented an earlier version of this paper at the Celtic Conference in Classics (Edinburgh, July 
2010, Panel: Animals in the Greek and Roman World).
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Introduction
Intersections between philosophy and literature were of course not only fre-
quent but somehow inevitable in classical Greece. The word ‘literature’ did 
not even exist, and philosophy, a relatively new term, was a battleground in 
the 4th Century, the main contenders being Plato and Isocrates2. In Plato’s 
Phaedrus, a work which is in many ways both philosophical and literary, the 
word poietes is referred to poets and prose-writers alike3. However, poetry 
and myth had long been the objects of attacks and critiques on the part of 
historians, sophists and scientists. I will examine this tension from a particu-
lar angle, namely that of the animal world. Animals are of course ubiquitous 
in Greek poetry, and they play a major role as early as in Homer: nobody is 
likely to forget Achilles’ horses or Odysseus’ dog. It was only in the fourth 
Century that animals became the object of a specific form of rational inquiry, 
namely zoology. I will argue that Plato provides an intriguing compromise 
between the old ‘poetic’ view of animals and the new scientific approach that 
was bound to play a major role in Aristotle’s philosophy.
The epiphany of zoology
Who invented zoology? The beginnings of this branch of science are obscure, 
and in some respects Aristotle’s anatomical treatises, which scholars increas-
ingly see as the backbone of his philosophy4, look very much like Athena 
jumping out of the head of Zeus. Only, the new-born child, far from a beauti-
ful baby-goddess, was seen as a rather monstrous offspring, inspiring disgust 
and repulsion:
Since we have completed stating the way things appear to us about 
the divine things, it remains to speak about the animal nature ... For 
even in the study of animals disagreeable to perception, the nature 
that crafted them likewise provides extraordinary pleasures to those 
who are able to know their causes and are by nature philosophers ... 
2  See Nightingale 1995, 13ff.
3  Cf. 234e, 236d, 258a, 258b, 278e.
4  See e.g. Heath 2013, 56ff.
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For this reason we should not be childishly disgusted at the exami-
nation of the less valuable animals. For in all natural things there is 
something marvellous (Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, 645a4-17).
Aristotle’s apologetic tone is unmistakable, and points to the suspicions that 
must have surrounded the invention of zoology - think of Aristophanes’ 
Clouds, featuring a grotesque Socrates discussing the anatomy of mosqui-
toes5. Rather more surprisingly, philosophers should be credited with a no 
less ground-breaking idea, namely that humans can be distinguished from 
other species inasmuch as they are, supposedly, rational beings. In a recent 
and persuasive book6, John Heath has argued that from Homer through all 
the archaic period and well into the fifth Century there was a basic opposition 
between animals and human beings, one that easily extended to other alleg-
edly ‘non-man’ creatures such as slaves, women and barbarians7: unexpect-
edly, this opposition was not to do, if not marginally, with rationality as such, 
and was rather connected with the simple notion of authoritative speech8.
On the one hand, animals were thought to differ from men in that they 
cannot speak at all, let alone with authority. On the other hand, animals were 
thought to be very much like us because their inner system of emotions, 
instincts and volitions was not perceived as significantly different than ours, 
something that - as Heath notes - can be easily argued for by analysing Hom-
er’s (and other poets’) vocabulary. After all, the only time Achilles’ horse Xan-
thuss given the gift of speech, he proves fully human9. This profound anal-
ogy is the rationale behind Homer’s similes (most of which revolve around 
animals), Aesop’s fables and more generally the widespread notion that an 
animal’s and a man’s mind work by and large in the same way10. According to 
Heath, it was the philosophers who first pointed to rationality as the hallmark 
5  Clouds, 156ff.
6  Heath 2005.
7  This of course makes the very notion of ‘animal’ a problematic one. Arguably, ‘animals’ are the 
result of a cultural ‘invention’. See e.g. Wolff 1997.
8  For an ample discussion of the ancient debate about the more or less rational faculties of ani-
mals, see Sorabji 1993.
9 Iliad 19.404ff.
10  For an extensive survey of animals in ancient Greek sources, see Dumont 2001.
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of humans11. That humans (or should I say Greek, male, free humans) are 
foremost rational animals is of course a quintessentially Aristotelian notion, 
and yet according to Heath Plato, in important ways, anticipated his pupil.
 Needless to say, this is yet one more account of a very familiar story, 
namely the teleological trajectory supposedly leading from mythos to logos, 
complete with its occasionally derogatory overtones (which, it must be noted, 
are otherwise wholly absent from Heath’s account). By contrast, I will linger 
on two creatures that do not fall within Heath’s dichotomy between speak-
ing men and inarticulate animals, inasmuch as they are both endowed with 
a fully meaningful voice, pointing to dialogue, that is Plato’s quintessentially 
philosophical tool. Plato’s cicadas and swans are a curious hybrid, combining 
poetic traditions and ethology in embryo. As such - and this will be my main 
point - they reveal Plato’s intention not so much to abandon myth in favour of 
logos as to create a new mythology, critically incorporating what were possibly 
the first attempts at zoological inquiries.
Swans in the Phaedo
Let us begin with Plato’s celebrated swans in the Phaedo:
Simmias! I should have hard work to persuade other people that I do 
not regard my present situation as a misfortune, when I cannot even 
make you believe it, but you are afraid I am more churlish now than 
I used to be. And you seem to think I am inferior in prophetic power 
to the swans who sing at other times also, but when they feel that 
they are to die, sing most and best in their joy that they are to go to 
the god whose servants they are. But men, because of their own fear 
of death, misrepresent the swans and say that they sing for sorrow, 
in mourning for their own death. They do not consider that no bird 
sings when it is hungry or cold or has any other trouble; no, not even 
the nightingale or the swallow or the hoopoe which are said to sing in 
lamentation. I do not believe they sing for grief, nor do the swans; but 
since they are Apollo’s birds, I believe they have prophetic vision, and 
because they have foreknowledge of the blessings in the other world 
11  Heath is thus to interpret along original lines such over-studied masterpieces as the Iliad, the 
Odyssey, the Oresteia and Plato’s dialogues, all of which can be fruitfully examined through this 
polarity/analogy.
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they sing and rejoice on that day more than ever before. And I think 
that I am myself a fellow-servant of the swans; and am consecrated to 
the same God and have received from our master a gift of prophecy 
no whit inferior to theirs, and that I go out from life with as little sor-
row as they. So far as this is concerned, then, speak and ask what ever 
questions you please, so long as the eleven of the Athenians permit 
(Phaedo, 84e-85b, transl. Fowler).
Scholars have thoroughly investigated the fascinating traditions linking swans 
to poetry and prophecy, so I need not linger on this point here12. Suffice it to 
say that swans feature as singing servants of Apollo and as the embodiment 
of poetry as early as in one of the Homeric hymns (XXIII), and swan songs are 
connected to prophecy already in the Oresteia13. To be sure, the legend of the 
swan song - which incidentally has been proven true by modern research14 - 
is presented as a self-evident fact in the Phaedo.
Rather less obviously, the alleged misrepresentation of swans by these un-
identified men is part of a consistent strategy designed to represent Socrates’ 
death in a distinctly anti-tragic way, inasmuch as swans, along with the three 
birds they are compared to, were closely - and wrongly, according to Socrates 
- associated with tragic poetry15. Before telling the myth, we are told, Socrates 
laughs, and then he laughs again at the end of the final myth just before 
drinking the hemlock: this is all the more remarkable because there is no 
other instance of Socrates’ laughter in the entire Platonic corpus. Thus, swans 
clearly embody the philosopher’s studium mortis and his willingness to joy-
fully ‘sing’, i.e. practice philosophical dialogue, on the very day of his death16.
12  See e.g. Lanna 2009, with further bibliography.
13  Agamemnon 1445. For a good introduction, see the first chapter of Jacob 2000. A more detai-
led and factual account is given by Baletti 1998.
14  See Arnott 1977.
15  Relevant loci classici include Aeschilus Agamemnon 1440ss., Euripides Hercules Furens 110 
(and, implicitly, Sophocles Antigone 883-884: see Vidal-Naquet 1993). The nightingale, the 
swallow and the hoopoe feature prominently in the quintessentially tragic myth of Tereus, Procne 
and Philomela, and especially the nightingale was considered, ever since Homer, the embodiment 
of grief. On the Phaedo’s anti-tragic strategies see Nussbaum 1986 (see the section on Plato’s ‘anti-
-tragic theatre’) and especially Susanetti 2002.
16  Thus emphasising that philosophy cannot be limited to rational arguments (see e.g. Gallop 
2001) and possibly the superiority of oral speech in comparison to written texts (Lasserre 1986).
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So far, so good, yet what is more interesting from my point of view are two 
neglected points. First, Socrates’ words have a curious allure, as he maintains 
that swans ‘sing at other times also, but when they feel that they are to die, 
sing most and best’. These words can be compared with a passage from the 
(possibly spurious) IX book of Aristotle’s Historia Animalium17:
Swans are singing birds, and they sing especially towards the end of 
their life (Aristotle, Historia animalium, 615a-b).
As will be immediately clear, even the wording of this sentence is very close 
to Plato’s. Another bit of evidence possibly comes from Aelian:
Hemlock is lethal to swans (The Nature of Animals, 3.7).
In the light of this passage, it might be tempting to see Plato’s comparison 
between Socrates and swans as a somewhat technical allusion to his master’s 
impending death, but Aelian’s remark is of course very late and might ulti-
mately derive from the Phaedo itself. Be that as it may, Socrates’ words sound 
very much like what we would call today ‘ethology’, i.e. the study of the be-
haviour of animals. To the modern reader’s surprise, however, the ethological 
argument (no bird ever sings out of grief etc.) rapidly recedes and gives way 
to a theological remark: qua Apollo’s attendants, swans cannot but be en-
dowed with prophetic powers, allowing them to understand that death is no 
fearful event. To be sure, this is the main point of the entire simile: Socrates, 
too, is an attendant of Apollo, and as such he knows in advance that there is 
no reason to be afraid.
What we have in the Phaedo, then, is a curious mixture of bird-ethology 
and theology, whence my strange subtitle ‘ornitheology’. To conclude with 
the Phaedo, however, three more points should be noted. To begin with, the 
passage, with its mention of Socrates’ last ‘chanting’ (ado), interestingly reso-
nates with the final eschatological myth, which famously ends on a sceptical 
note: according to Socrates, it is impossible to attain full certainty as to the 
details of the metaphysical world, and still it is worthwhile to try and describe 
it (kalos o kindynos) in the attempt of ‘enchanting’ (epado) oneself (114d) - and 
this is of course Socrates’ own swan song. Secondly, the ethological argument 
is fully absorbed in an overtly mythological narrative, and in this context 
17  See e.g. Vegetti 1971, 127f.
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‘science’ hardly enjoys pride of place. Thirdly, and finally, no reader can for-
get that in the very last days of his life Socrates, to the surprise of everybody 
and especially of the sophist Evenus, makes his debut as a musician, setting 
to music Aesop’s fables and a hymn to Apollo because ‘a poet, if he is really 
to be a poet, must compose myths and not speeches’ (61b). This choice has 
an obvious connection to the myth of the swans, in that swans are Apollo’s 
servants precisely in one of Homer’s hymns, and - needless to say - they be-
long to Aesop’s animal world18. Moreover, the mixture between the humble 
(i.e. Aesop) and the sublime (i.e. Apollo)19 resembles Plato’s ideal poet as 
described at the end of the Symposium, when Socrates famously states that 
a true poet should be able to compose both tragedy and comedy20. The true 
poet and myth-maker is of course Plato himself, and it comes as no surprise 
that animals feature so largely in his own myths.
Cicadas in the Phaedrus
It is no coincidence that Socrates’ ‘music’ in the Phaedo (and by extension 
Plato’s own mythmaking) is implicitly contrasted with the activity of Evenus, 
a sophist who probably never composed any myth and was rather likely to 
despise mythology, as many of his contemporaries did. Interestingly, the Pha-
edo concludes with a myth that may be incredible for someone who is am-
biguously referred to as a deinos aner (114d), i.e. a clever/terrible man. With 
this contrast in mind, let us now turn to the Phaedrus. On the banks of the 
Ilissus, on a glorious summer day, Socrates quietly resists Phaedrus’ attempts 
to deconstruct the local myth of Oreithyia, simply saying that he has no time 
(schole) nor inclination to rationalise myth: in such matters, he prefers to 
stick to tradition. Rationalising myth, he maintains, is the province of a dei-
nos aner (229d), that is - again - a clever/terrible man. This clever guy - adds 
Socrates - would be at pains to examine and rationalise all of the fabulous 
18  As many authors in many different genres, Plato does sometimes resort to Aesop’s fables (Alci-
biades Major 123), and it comes as no surprise that Aristotle hints at the analogy between Aesop’s 
fables and Socrates’ parables (Rhetoric II 20, 1393b9-1394a1). See Desclos 1997.
19  See Nagy 2011, with further bibliography (including references to Nagy’s own previous work 
and to Kurke 2011, who articulates the polarity between Apollo and Aesop in ways that signifi-
cantly differ from Nagy’s).
20  This and other passages are the object of Gaiser 1984, focusing on Plato’s hints at his own 
output.
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and astonishing animals of Greek mythology, and would end up living an 
exhausting and miserable life. Not surprisingly, then, Socrates later produces 
his own myth about eros and the hyperuranian world, with the authority of 
a Muse-inspired poet and an interesting emphasis on animals - think of the 
careful and detailed descriptions of the soul’s horses, who, interestingly, are 
endowed with speech21. Still more to the point, Socrates criticises a second 
time the rationalism of Phaedrus, alleging that a lover of music - remember 
the Phaedo - should not ignore such a myth as that of the cicadas. Here is the 
passage:
Socrates: We have plenty of time, apparently; and besides, the cicadas 
seem to be looking down upon us as they sing and talk with each other 
in the heat. Now if they should see us not dialoguing at mid-day, but, 
like most people, dozing, lulled to sleep by their song because of our 
mental indolence, they would quite justly laugh at us, thinking that 
some slaves had come to their resort and were slumbering about the 
fountain at noon like sheep. But if they see us dialoguing and sailing 
past them unmoved by the charm of their Siren voices, perhaps they 
will be pleased and give us the gift which the gods bestowed on them 
to give to men. Phaedrus: What is this gift? I don’t seem to have heard 
of it. Socrates: It is quite improper for a lover of the Muses never to 
have heard of such things. The story goes that these cicadas were once 
men, before the birth of the Muses, and when the Muses were born 
and song appeared, some of the men were so overcome with delight 
that they sang and sang, forgetting food and drink, until at last un-
consciously they died. From them the cicada tribe afterwards arose, 
and they have this gift from the Muses, that from the time of their 
birth they need no sustenance, but sing continually, without food or 
drink, until they die, when they go to the Muses and report who 
honours each of them on earth. They tell Terpsichore of those who 
have honoured her in dances, and make them dearer to her; they gain 
the favour of Erato for the poets of love, and that of the other Muses 
for their votaries, according to their various ways of honouring them; 
and to Calliope, the eldest of the Muses, and to Urania who is next 
to her, they make report of those who pass their lives in philosophy 
and who worship these Muses who are most concerned with heaven 
21  Cf. 254d-e.
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and with thought divine and human and whose music is the sweetest. 
So for many reasons we ought to talk and not sleep in the noontime 
(Phaedrus 258e-259d, transl. Fowler, slightly mod.).
Although many modern readers have grossly misinterpreted it, the meaning 
of the myth is rather straightforward22. Socrates and Phaedrus should imitate 
the untiring cicadas, singing and dialoguing all day with no need for mate-
rial comforts. As such, the cicadas, no less than the swans of the Phaedo, are 
a perfect symbol for the philosopher, with the usual assimilation between 
song and dialectic in a world Platonically dominated by the Sun-Good, and 
the inevitable misunderstandings of the many: arguably, ‘cicada’ was even a 
comic nickname for ‘philosopher’23. Moreover, certain elements of the setting 
should be especially noted, such as the summer noon, the countryside, the 
presence of animals and of playful Muse-like daemons eventually granting 
a divine gift: all of these details are embedded in a sacred landscape24, and 
closely recall the tradition of poetic initiation. The relevant stories of Hes-
iod, Archilochus, Epimenides and later Aesop follow the very same pattern, 
with the important difference that in the Phaedrus there are two dialoguing 
initiates, rather than one solitary poet, something that arguably points to the 
dialectical character of Socratic philosophy25.
To be sure, the myth of the cicadas builds on a well-established poetic 
tradition, whereby cicadas were seen as a quintessentially musical and frugal 
creature. Think e.g. of Hesiod’s Scutum:
And when the dark-winged chirping cicada, which drinks and eats 
the gentle dew, begins to sing to men, sitting on a green branch in the 
summer, and all day long and early in the morning it pours forth its 
voice in the most dread heat, when Sirius parches the skin... (Hesiod, 
Shield, 393-397).
22  See Capra 2000, with further bibliography.
23  See Capra 2000.
24  See Assaël 2003 for the association of this landscape with mysteric cults and Gottfried 1993 
for the inverse inversed analogy between the myth of the cicadas and the cult of Pan.
25  I develop the argument in full in my book Plato’s Four Muses (forthcoming for the CHS Helle-
nic Series, HUP, 2014). Cf. also Capra 2008.
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The tradition is very rich and well documented, so, again, I need not linger 
on it. What is less obvious, once again, is the curiously ethological overtones 
of certain expressions. Compare, for example, the way Aristotle reworks the 
traditional image of the cicada:
The larva, when it has increased in size in the ground, becomes a 
‘mother-of-cicada’; and that is the time when they are pleasantest to 
eat, before the integument bursts open. When the time of the solstice 
approaches, the creature comes out under cover of night, the integu-
ment immediately breaks open, and there you have cicadas instead of 
‘mothers’: they turn black at once, and harder, and larger, and begin 
singing (Aristotle, Historia animalium 556b6-12, transl. Peck).
Aristotle, who elsewhere is at pains to account for the frugality of cicadas with 
the argument that cicadas are the only mouthless animal on earth (532b11ff.), 
points to an interesting detail: as soon as they are born, cicadas start singing. 
This detail is not found in the poetic tradition, but is emphatically referred 
to in the Phaedrus, as Socrates points out that cicadas start singing right after 
their birth. Just as in the Phaedo, however, the ethological mode, which clear-
ly parallels Aristotle’s statement, immediately makes way for an unexpected 
mythological turn: the cicadas are the servants of the Muses, and have the 
function of rewarding those who honour them. The metamorphosis, more-
over, is presumably designed to evoke the myth of Tithonus, who came close 
to disappearing and was eventually transformed into an ever singing cicada, a 
creature with a great voice and virtually no bodily presence. All in all, Plato’s 
cicadas closely parallel the swans of the Phaedo: Plato knows how to ap-
propriate some features of an incipient entomologic ethology, but he makes 
it very clear that his real aim is to create new philosophical myths, a sort of 
‘entomythology’, as it were.
Conclusions
With his Historia Animalium, dating to the time when he was still a disciple 
of Plato, Aristotle launched zoology, which in his later treatises came to be 
increasingly based on anatomy, thus setting the agenda for many centuries of 
future biology. With the hardly metaphorical knife of science, he thus severed 
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the ancient ties between humans and animals26, so clearly visible in Greek 
mythology: traditionally, for example, cicadas were thought to sing out of 
philanthropy, whereas Aristotle readily points out that they approach humans 
due to poor sight27. By contrast Plato, who was possibly aware of some preco-
cious attempts at zoological inquiries, twice crosses the threshold of ethology, 
only to step back immediately, with a sudden mythological u-turn. At close 
scrutiny, the context of both myths reveals a number of unnoticed analogies: 
Plato’s ‘ornitheology’ and ‘entomythology’ are part of a careful strategy, aiming 
at saving and rejuvenating the venerable tradition of mythology along with its 
rich and ‘humane’ zoo28. Both myths, moreover, have powerful meta-literary 
overtones, in that they allude to a new kind of poetic initiation that con-
sciously distances itself from the excesses of rational cleverness. Life is short, 
time is precious: Plato seems to have no time for deconstructing mythology 
- far less for dissecting animals. Rather, as is suggested right at the beginning 
of the cicada myth, he has ‘plenty of time’ (schole) to narrate beautiful no less 
than meaningful stories about animals29. The Muses certainly granted him 
their precious gift, combining traditional mythology with a hint of philo-
sophical as well as poetic zoology.
26  See Vegetti 1979. Aristotle’s knife concealed no less than revealed important aspects of the 
animal world.
27  Historia Animalium 556B17-21.
28  Cicadas and swans are just an example, and there is of course much more to Plato’s animals. 
For a good introduction to the subject, see Pinotti 1994.
29  Schole is a key-notion in Plato’s dialogues: see Isebaert 1992.
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